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H. Substitutionary construction of "Dying Without Issue"
The common law, as above pointed out, had its own per-
plexities. "Issue" might mean "heirs of the body"-presumptively
did mean "heirs of the body" in the case of land. On the other
hand, it might mean "children" and presumptively did mean "chil-
dren" in the case of personalty. "Without issue", on the other
hand, might in different contexts either mean without ever having
had children, or without children surviving, or even when all
descendants shall have expired. For centuries the courts wrestled
with such problems of construction, reaching certain conclusions,
some of which, having in time proved unsatisfactory, were repealed
or modified by statute. The curious fact must now be referred to
that after centuries of such discussion, and after the formulation
of well-defined rules on the subject, many of the courts in this
country suddenly discovered a totally new meaning for the expres-
sion "if A die without issue". Instead of meaning "if A die
without leaving issue", or "if A die without ever having had issue",
or "when A's issue or descendants shall all have expired", the
fertile imagination of the courts referred to discovered in these
words this quite new and startling meaning "if A dies without
issue in the testator's lifetime only"; this is called the substitution-
ary construction of the words in question, because manifestly,
where adopted, it means that if A survives the testator he takes
outright and free from any contingency whatever, whereas, on the
other hand, if he dies in the testator's lifetime, and only in that
event, B, the devisee over, is to take in his place. It is, to say the
least, startling that this new interpretation should have been dis-
covered after centuries of discussion about this familiar phrase,
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and it is proposed to investigate the origin of this substitutionary
doctrine in Pennsylvania and some of the sister states.
Mickley's Appeal I is often referred to as the foundation of
this doctrine in Pennsylvania. 2 An examination of the authorities,
however, seems to show a distinctly earlier origin, perhaps the
earliest case being Biddle's Estate.' In that case the testatrix gave
" . .to my daughter Anne E. Biddle everything of which I
die possessed. In the event of my daughter's death without chil-
dren", she gave sundry bequests, including a gift of the residue to
a niece and nephew, followed by the clause "In the event of the
death of these", a gift over to five individuals. On the filing of
the executor's account, the daughter, Anne, claimed that she was
absolutely entitled to this personalty; the other parties named in
the will claimed that she must give security to protect the interest
of those who might be entitled at her death. The lower court took
the latter view, but its decree was reversed by the' Supreme Court
in a short opinion by Lowrie, J., who said:
"The first clause plainly gives the daughter an absolute
estate. . . . Very naturally the testator's next thought is to
make other disposition 'in the event of her daughter's death
without children? But death whcn? There is not a word to
inform us. The intention is therefore ambiguous. Another
clause has the same ambiguity. The residue given to Grace
and Richard Biddle is to go over 'in the event of their death'.
"How are we to deal with this ambiguity? Consider
that the devise to Anne is absolute, with no word directly
tending to show an intention to reduce it to a life estate or to
a conditional fee; and it is perfectly consistent with this to
suppose that the subsequent dispositions were intended to take
effect if Anne should die before her mother.. .. And this
supposition derives support from the residuary clause alluded
to; for it would make the shares of Grace and Richard Biddle
absolute, if ever they should vest in possession, and without
it they would not be so."'
'92 Pa. 514 (18So).
2 See Madden, Death Without Issue (1930) 3 Pa. B. A. Q. 28, 31.
328 Pa. 59 (1857).
'Ibid. at 62 (Italics ours).
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Without continuing the quotation, the court, without citing any
Pennsylvania authorities except Caldwell v. Skilton,a reached the
conclusion that the gift over was inoperative, because only intended
to take effect if the daughter died in her mother's lifetime-which,
of course, she had not done. In such casual way, this important
change in the law of Pennsylvania was made. But we can go
further and, if we do not find a justification, can at least find some
explanation of the decision in the case cited, namely, Caldwell v.
Skilton. In that case the gift was to A and his heirs, but if he die
then to his children, but if he have no children, then to X." There
were two reasons why in that case the gift over to X was held to
be effective only if A died in the testator's lifetime. The first and
perhaps principal reason was that the phrase "if A die" obviously
denotes a contingency of some kind; as death is a certainty, the
testator who uses such a phrase must have meant death within a
limited time, and in a case like Caldwell v. Skilton, the only pos-
sible limit of time is the testator's own lifetime; some such words
must in the nature of things be written into such a will or otherwise
the expression "if he die" is meaningless. This rule is universally
recognized even in jurisdictions where the courts have declined to
carry the so-called substitutionary theory any further.
7
The second reason for the decision in Caldwell v. Skilton was
somewhat similar; the gift over "if A die" was either to his chil-
dren, or if he had no children, to X. As he manifestly must die
either with or without children, the "if" clause again would have
no meaning unless restricted to death within a particular time.
This added reason for the decision was emphasized by the court,
and indeed leaves no doubt as to the propriety of the conclusion of
the court, even if there were otherwise any doubt (which there
was not). Caldwell z'. Skilton, however, is manifestly a very
insufficient foundation for the decision in Biddle's Estate, and
Biddle's Estate must perhaps be added to the list of cases in which
Chief Justice Lowrie has been responsible for guiding the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania into somewhat uncertain and devious ways.
13 Pa. 152 (185o).
'Ibid. at 153.
' Chesebrow v. Palmer, 68 Conn. 207, 36 Atl. 42 (1896) ; Steinhart v. Wolf,
Palmer, 68 Conn. 207, 36 At. 42 (1896).
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In Biddle's Estate, the matter was apparently not given very serious
consideration, but Mickley's Appeal S presented substantially the
same question, and the report shows that the opposing argument
was very fully presented by counsel. In this case the testator
divided the residue of his estate into sixths and gave one-sixth to
each of several children including two sons, John and Joseph.
Following the gift was this provision: "I direct that if either of
my sons should die without leaving issue at the time of his death,
the share given to such son shall pass to and be divided among
such of my children as may be then living, and to the issue of such
as may be dead, such issue, however, taking only the share of their
parent", with a further provision that in such case the portions
going to a daughter shall be held in trust like the original shares
given the daughters. The Orphans' Court decreed that the executor
pay the distributive shares to the sons in their own right absolutely.
On appeal by the trustee. (presumably on behalf of the daughters),
counsel for the appellant statcd the principles very clearly:
"In order to a clear understanding of the law applicable
to this bequest, we must carefully distinguish between the case
of a bequest to A., and if he should die, to B., and the case of
a bequest to A., and if he should die 'without issue', or 'with-
out children', or 'without leaving issue living at the time of his
death'. In the first class of cases, that of a bequest to A.,
absolutely or indefinitely, and if he should die, to B., the rule
of construction applicable, and the reason for such rule, are
most clearly set out in the opinion of Sir John Romilly, M.R.,
in the case of Edwards v. Edwards, 15 Beav. 357 (year
1852), as follows: 'As the testator speaks of death-the most
certain of all things-as a contingency, it can only be made
contingent by reference to its taking place before a particular
period, and as no period of time is mentioned in the will, it
is necessarily presumed that the period of time, to which the
testator refers, is the period of possession or enjoyment; that
is, his own death, when the legacy to A. will take effect; and
the subsequent limitation is introduced to prevent a lapse of
the legacy in case A. did not survive the testator. In such
cases, therefore, the rule may be considered settled, that the
bequest must be read somewhat to this effect, that is to say, a
'Supra note I.
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bequest to A., but if A. shall die before the bequest becomes
vested in him, then to B., and the consequence is this, if A.
survives the testator, he takes an absolute vested interest.
"The law applicable to the second class of cases, and in
which class the bequest now under consideration falls, is like-
wise in the same case clearly set out, and a distinction drawn
between the two classes of cases. In the second of the sup-
posed cases, there is a manifest distinction. There the event
spoken of on which the legacy is to go over is not a certain,
but a contingent event. It is not in the case of the death of
A., but in the case of his death without issue, or without leav-
ing a child; and here it would be importing a meaning and
adding words to the will, if it were to be construed as a con-
dition to entitle B. to take upon the death of A. without issue,
if it was to happen at some particular period. In these cases
it has always been held, if at any time, whether before or after
the death of the testator, A. died without leaving a child, the
gift over takes effect, and the legacy vests in B.; this is best
established by the case of Farthing v. Allen, reported only in
2 Jarman on Wills 688. All those cases are, of course, liable
to be varied by the force of the particular expressions which
the testator may have made use of in his will, importing a
different intention; but they do not affect the rule-on the
contrary, they must be held tacitly to admit the application of
it, inasmuch as they are treated as exceptions to an existing
rule." 9
Mr. John G. Johnson, cotirisel for appellees, relied principally
on Caldwell v. Skilton and Biddle's Estate. In affirming the decree
of the lower court, Chief Justice Sharswood admitted that English
cases such as O'Mahoney v. Burdett 1o supported appellant's con-
tention, but continued:
"It is very clearly settled, both in England and in this
state, that if a bequest be made to a person absolute in the first
instance, and it is provided that in the event of death, or death
without issue, another legatee or legatees shall be substituted
to the share or legacy thus given, it shall be construed to mean
death or death without issue before the testator." 1
'Ibid. at 515.
10L. R. 7 H. L. 388, 395 (874).
USup-.a note i, at 517 (Italics ours).
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This was an inaccurate statement of the English law so far as the
case of "death without issue" is concerned, though Biddle's Estate
partially justifies the correctness of the statement so far as Penn-
sylvania law is concerned. This is substantially the whole ground
of the decision except for the fact that the court, in further support
of its decision, says that:
"Thus, while 'according to the construction contended
for, [but not adopted by the court], the original share of the
son would be held subject to the executory bequest over, the
accrued share would be held absolutely, while the accrued
shares of the daughters would be held exactly as the original
shares." 12
Without pursuing the discussion further, in spite of a care-
fully reasoned argument to the contrary, Chief Justice Sharswood
adopted the so-called substitutionary rule of construction-possibly
without realizing that, in so doing, he was flying in the face of
probably hundreds of cases both in this state and in other jurisdic-
tions in which the words "if either of my sons should die without
leaving issue living at the time of his death" had been held without
question to cover the case of death without leaving issue living,
either during the testator's lifetime, or after his decease.
There is a long line of Pennsylvania cases in which the same
principle is adopted and somewhat expanded. In Coles v. Ayres,11
there was a gift of the rcsidue of the testator's estate to his children
in equal shares: "If both my children should die intestate and
without lawful heirs", then over. The words "and without lawful
heirs" were held equivalent to "dying without issue", and it was
held that the children on surviving their parent's death, therefore,
took an absolute estate free from any contingency. In McAlpin's
Estate,14 a testator had by will bequeathed one-third of his estate
to trustees, in trust to pay the income to a daughter for life, and
then "in case all her children shall depart this life without issue,
the part or share in this ny last will and testament devised to the
said children of my daughter Mary shall revert to and be equally
r'Ibid. at 518.
"3156 Pa. 197, 27 Atl. 375 (1893).
14211 Pa. 26, 6o AtI. 321 (I9O5).
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divided among my surviving heirs". It was held that the testa-
tor's children, having survived the daughter, took an absolute
estate free from any condition. Judge Penrose, in his opinion in
the lower court, while pointing out that "The doctrine of Mickley's
Appeal is not in accordance with the English decisions as to imme-
diate gifts, if the limitation over is 'in case of death without
issue' ", nevertheless adds: "but where these words are annexed
to a gift in remainder, even the English cases hold that they are
referable to a death without issue before the time of distribu-
tion","5 and McAlpin's Estate may, therefore, be classed with
Jessup v. Smuck 16 and others, as being correctly decided, apart
from any doubt that may exist as to the propriety of Mickley's
Appeal. Seewald's Estate 17 points out that the rule in Mlickley's
Appeal has been "established by numerous decisions both before
and since this legislation" ;18 it was there held that "the words 'die
without issue' . . followed by the clause 'living at the time of
his death' . are not sufficient to show testator contemplated
the residuary gift taking effect, if at all, at the death of the son
rather than at his own death". 9
The substitutionary theory, however, although very deeply
embedded in the law of Pennsylvania, has not entirely superseded
the so-called successive theory with which it largely conflicts. Even
before Biddle's Estate,2 0 in Jessup v. Smtuck, 21 an unsuccessful
effort was made to establish the substitutionary rule. In that case
the testator had devised certain lands to his son Samuel in fee "he
or they [the heirs] paying thereout and therefor certain legacies",
and by a subsequent provision he stipulated "in case my said son
Samuel should die before he marries", then all his share to go to
a son Joel. Samuel, upon his father's death, took possession, paid
the legacies and later died intestate and without having married.
The plaintiffs, who were devisees of his brother Joel, claimed the
'Ibid. at 29, 6o Atl. at 322.
I6 Pa. 327 (185i).
a28I Pa. 483, 127 Atl. 63 (1924).
"'Ibid. at 486, 127 Atl. at 64 (referring to Act of July 9, 1897, P. L. 213).
10 Ibid. at 487, 127 Atl. at 64, citing Morrison v. Truby, 145 Pa. 540, 22
Atl. 972 (i891).
ISupra note 3.
1 I6 Pa. 327 (i851).
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land in controversy in this action of ejectment. Fully sustaining
the substitutionary viewpoint, the lower court entered judgment
for the defendant, saying, "The devise to Joel, we think, was only
intended as a substitution in case of the death of Samuel unmarried
before the death of the testator". 22 As pointed out by the Supreme
Court, the case was "prepared with great industry and research
by the counsel on both sides who have argued it with much learning
and ability".2 3 Counsel for the defendants-in-error thus stated the
substitutionary doctrine:
"We submit, therefore, that the rule is too firmly estab-
lished to be shaken, that where the devise is immediate and
absoltte, a devise to another, in case of the death of the first-
named devisee, although connected with some collateral cir-
cumstance, is substitutionary only, and refers to the death of
the first devisee in the lifetime of the testator. There cannot
be any difference whether the collateral circumstance be the
having issue, having children, or the marriage of the first
devisee. The conjunction of the circumstance with the event
of the devisee's death might be thought to import a contin-
tingency in the one case as much as in the other. But the
conjunction of such personal circumstances with the event of
death does not, under the rule, determine the contingency
which the testator contemplated; and to effectuate his inten-
tion, and not destroy the estate he has given, it becomes
necessary to refer the happening of the event to the period of
the testator's death." 24
The Supreme Court, however, declined to take the substitutionary
view, reversed the judgment and entered judgment for the plain-
tiffs, saying:
"The testator was providing for the disposition of his
estate after his decease, and must be supposed to refer to
events, and their occurrence in time subsequent to his death.
. . . The provisions in terms of this will are strong to show
that the testator contemplated and provided for the death of
Samuel, without marriage, at any period of his life, as the
'Ibid. at 330.
'Ibid. at 338.
"4Ibid. at 337.
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time and event on which the property in controversy was to
pass over to Joel." 25
After stating the substitutionary rule, the court said:
* . . this construction is only made ex necessitate rei, from
the absence of any other period to which the words may be
referred, as a testator is not supposed to contemplate the
event of himself surviving the objects of his bounty." 20
The court points out that "none of the cases referred to and relied
on for the defendants, connect marriage with the event of death",
and points to other clauses in the will to show that, in this will, the
testator was contemplating things to be done after his death.
Again, in Matlack v. Roberts, 27 a testator devised his real
estate to two sons, adding this clause, "And in case of the death of
either of my children unmarried or without issue, then I do order
that the share of said child or children so dying, may be divided
equally among my surviving daughters or their heirs". Testator
left two sons and four daughters, including one, Martha Matlack,
the mother of the plaintiff. After the testator's death, the real
estate was sold by the sheriff on a judgment obtained against the
testator in his lifetime. After paying the judgment and other
claims, there was a balance due a son, John, of $5800, which was
paid to him. He subsequently died, unmarried and without issue,
having by will given all his estate to his nephew, Edwin Roberts.
In this action of assumpsit by Albert Matlack, the son of Martha,
against Edwin Roberts, as executor of John Roberts, deceased, the
plaintiff contended that the devise to John was in fee tail, and that
as devisee of the land he received the balance of the proceeds on
the same terms, and that, therefore, on the death of John unmar-
ried and without issue, the plaintiff as the heir of one of the daugh-
ters was entitled to share in the $58oo. The lower court entered
judgment for the defendant which was affirmed by the Supreme
Court, which held, following Vaughan v. Dickes,21 that "dying be-
'-Ibid. at 339.
'Ibid. at 340, citing 2 PoWVEUL, DEVISES (1827) 763.
"54 Pa. 148 (1867).
2920 Pa. 509 (1853).
58o UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
fore marriage indicated nothing definite in the period when the
failure of issue should take place", 29 that, therefore, John took an
estate tail, (though for other reasons plaintiff was not entitled to
recover). The importance of the decision for our purposes is that
the Supreme Court declined to hold that the expression "in case
of the death of either of my children unmarried or without issue"
meant a definite failure of issue, either in the testator's lifetime
(the substitutionary theory), or at any time in the devisee's life-
time (the successive theory) ; on the contrary, they held that the
words meant an indefinite failure of issue and, therefore, gave the
sons an estate tail. They distinguished Jessup v. Smuck 30 and
other cases: "For in each of these cases special expressions are
found which lead to the conclusion a failure of issue within a defi-
nite period was intended"A 1 In both Jessup v. Sinuck and Matlack
v. Roberts, the Supreme Court declined to accept the substitution-
ary interpretation urged upon them; though not very consistently,
they in the former case held (correctly as it seems) that the clause
"if Samuel should die before he marries", meant the death of
Samuel at any time, whereas (with some hesitation, but in view
of Vaughan v. Dickes) in Matlack v. Roberts, they held that the
word "unmarried" must be entirely disregarded, and therefore
treated the words "without issue" as meaning an indefinite failure
of issue.
Again, in Ralston v. Truesdell,3 2 after a life estate in his wife,
the testator devised certain lands to a granddaughter and the heirs
of her body, "but if she should die and leave no child or children,
then in such a case the said property shall be sold to the best advan-
tage, and equally divided among my other legatees and their heirs".
After the widow's death, the granddaughter, Nancy, executed and
delivered to one Brownson a deed in fee in N hich it was recited
that the deed was executed for the purpose of destroying remain-
ders after Nancy's estate tail. Brownson thereupon reconveyed
to Nancy who later died leaving a will upon which letters of
administration c. t. a. were issued to Ralston, the plaintiff in this
'Supra note 27.
'"Stipra note 21.
' Supra note 27, at 150.
178 Pa. 429, 35 At. 813 (1896).
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case. He brought ejectment for this land against the defendants
who were the "other legatees" of the testator. It was argued for
the defendants that the words "but if she should die and leave no
child or children" modified the previous gift to Nancy and to the
heirs of her body, and that, Nancy having died without leaving
children, there was a gift over to the defendants. The lower
court, in an opinion which was affirmed by the Supreme Court,
held that both expressions, namely, "heirs of her body" and "child
or children", were used in their technical legal sense; that Nancy
took an estate tail subject to an executory devise over in favor of
the other legatees; and that her deed barred the entail and the
devise over. The significance of the case for the purpose of the
present discussion is that it was contended for the defendant that,
on the authority of King v. Frick,3 3 that "the testator intended the
devise over 'to his other legatees and their heirs' only in the event
of the death of the first taker, Nancy Ramsey, without children
during his life". The court, however, thought that the fact that
the gift to Nancy was only to take effect at the death of the testa-
tor's wife showed that the testator "in making the devise to Nancy
Ramsey referred to an event that would take place subsequent to
his death, to wit, the death of his wife". 34 In passing, it may be
noted that the court did not even consider the argument which has
been made in certain cases, that where there is a remainder gift
to a devisee (as in the case of Nancy) followed by a gift over in
a certain contingency, such contingency must be presumed to be
intended to happen only during the lifetime of the life tenant.
Finally, in Stoner v. Wunderlich,3' testator bequeathed certain
real estate to his son Frederick and provided "if the said Frederick
die without issue, and his wife survives him, she shall have the use
of the said lot No. 2 with the appurtenances during her life, and
at her death the said property shall revert to my surviving heirs".
The question was whether Frederick took a fee simple which he
could convey to the defendant. The lower court held that he could,
but the Supreme Court now reverses, saying, "But when did the
135 Pa. 575, 19 Atl. 951 (189o).
"Supra note 32, at 434, 35 At. 815.
198 Pa. i58, 47 At!. 945 (9o).
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testator contemplate that such an event [Frederick's death without
children] would occur? In a definite or indefinite period? Before
or after his own demise?" 3U It holds that the gift over means a
definite and not an indefinite failure of issue as is shown by the
gift over of the life estate to Frederick's wife. The Court then
faces the question whether the testator contemplated "that his son's
death would occur prior to his own death, and was the limitation
over made with that contemplation in view"; it holds that the will
as a whole clearly showed that this testator was contemplating
things that might happen after his death. While on its facts the
case may be distinguished from the substitutionary line of cases,
nevertheless it is to be noted that the Supreme Court cited Powell
on "Devises" 37 (as it had done years before in Jessup v. Sinuck) as
correctly stating that "this construction [the substitutionary con-
struction] is only made ex necessitate rei from the absence of any
other period to which the words may be referred, as a testator is
not supposed to contemplate the event of himself surviving the
objects of his bounty." Stoner v. JVnderlich was cited and fol-
lowed in Kirkpatrick's Estate.
3
8
An interesting side light on the history of the substitutionary
theory in Pennsylvania is thrown by the cases of Mitchell v. Pitts-
burgh Railway C'o. 3' and Barber v. Pittsburgh Railway Co.4"
Both these cases hinged upon the proper construction of the same
will. The testator had devised certain lots to one Amanda
Stephens stated in the will to be "now five years old", and provided
"In the event of Amanda dying unmarried, or, if married, dying
without offspring by her husband, then these lots are to be sold and
the proceeds to be divided equally amongst the heirs of John
'Ibid. at i6i, 47 Atl. at 946.
' Citing specifically page 763.,
3'28o Pa. 3o6, 124 Atd. 474 (1924). See also Daniels's Estate, 27 Pa.
Super. 358 (i o5), where, recognizing the force of the substitionary rule in
Pennsylvania, the court construed sundry clauses in the will, such as, for in-
stance, a clause with respect to a guardian for the first taker, as indicating that
the will might take effect before the beneficiary had obtained her majority, and
hence held that the testator, by the language, "if my said daughter, Mary B.
I)aniels, shall die before or after attaining the age of twenty-one years without
issue," meant a gift over if she die without issue at any time.
165 Pa. 645, 31 Aft. 67 (1895).
1os66 U. S. 83, 17 Sup. Ct. 488 (1897).
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Barber". After the testator's death Amanda married and had five
children, one of whom married, but all of whom died before their
mother without leaving offspring. In her life Amanda had joined
in a deed which, if the will created an estate tail in her, barred the
entail, and by sundry conveyances her title free from the entail
became vested in the defendants. In the action of ejectment in
Mitchell v. Pittsburgh Railway Co. which was brought by the
administrator c. t a. of decedent, the lower court entered judgment
for the defendants, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court,
which, after holding that Amanda took a fee simple by the original
words of the will, said:
"There are no words used in the second paragraph of the
will, containing the devise to Amanda, which indicate any
intent to limit her estate. Had the will stopped there, the
devise would unquestionably have been absolute. The follow-
ing paragraph was not intended to operate by way of limita-
tion, but was manifestly substitutionary in its character . . .
The devise is then in the first instance to Amanda; and in the
event of her dying without issue over to alternative bene-
ficiaries. Dying without issue was thus made the contingency
upon which the substituted beneficiaries could take: Coles v.
Ayres, 156 Pa. 197. But death when? Where, as here, there
is nothing to indicate an adverse intent, additional limitations
dependent on no other contingency than is implied from the
language, 'if any of them die', or 'in case of death', or the
like, cannot be referred to the event whenever it may hap-
pen,-for that would be to give a forced construction to the
words,-but must be construed as referring to death in asso-
ciation with some additional circumstance which makes it
actually contingent. That circumstance is said to be naturally
in regard to the time of happening, and that time, where, as
here, the gift is immediate, is necessarily the death of the
testator, there being no other period to which the death can
refer: Caldwell v. Skilton, 13 Pa. 152." 4'
The court felt fortified by the argument that "the power of sale
was intended to be exercised at a near, rather than a remote, period
after testator's death", and also that the gift over was to the
"heirs" of John Barber; this in the opinion of the court meant
'Supra note 39, at 650, 31 At. at 68.
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"the children of John Barber who were living". The Court also
thought that Amanda's extreme youth did not argue against the
substitutionary construction, especially as "No presumption could
arise from the fact of making a will that testator expected to die
before she should attain a marriageable age". The case is a more
or less logical deduction from Coles v. Ayres,42 where the language
used was "if both my children should die intestate and without
lawful heirs", and it was held on the substitutionary theory that the
children surviving the testator took an absolute estate.
In Barber v. Pittsburgh Railway Co. some of the children of
John Barber, being dissatisfied with the decision in Mitchell v.
Pittsburgh Railway Co., and being advised by counsel that that
decision was not conclusive, brought an independent action of
ejectment on precisely the same cause of action in the United States
Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. A judg-
ment for the defendants having been entered in the lower court,
the plaintiffs appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals which cer-
tified to the Supreme Court that it desired the instruction of that
court on the following question: "First. Is the decision of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, before referred to, conclusive?
If not, then, Second. What estate did Amanda Stephens take under
the devise ?" The case was elaborately argued by counsel for the
defendant Railway Company who maintained (i) that "The
proper construction of this will, under the law of Pennsylvania,
has been decided by the highest court of the State in the case of
Mitchell v. Pittsburgh Railway Co.,4 3 165 Pa. 645", and (2) that
"If the question as to the nature and extent of the title which
Amanda Stephens took under the will of Mr. Stevenson is open
in the Federal Courts for original investigation, then we assert
that she took a fee simple absolute", either because having taken
a fee tail she had barred the remainders by her deed, or because
"If the devise be construed a fee with limitation over, the fee
became absolute, because (a) the event upon which the limitation
must happen was under the rule of property in Pennsylvania re-
stricted in time to the lifetime of the testator, and admittedly it
i56 Pa. 197, 27 At!. 375 (1893).
'Supra note 39.
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did not so happen. (b) The conditions, upon the non-performance
of which the estate was to go over, were performed by Amanda.
She did not die unmarried-she married and had offspring by her
husband-and therefore the estate did not go to John Barber's
heirs". The Supreme Court certified that Amanda had an estate
tail. As to whether the opinion in the prior case was "conclusive
evidence of the law of Pennsylvania in a court of the United
States, depends upon the further question whether the opinion is
declaratory of the settled law of Pennsylvania as to the effect of
such devises, or is a decision upon the construction of this particu-
lar devise". Admitting the line of cases in Pennsylvania "in
which a devise over, after a devise in fee, has been held to be sub-
stitutionary, when expressed by such words as if the first taker
'die without children'; . . . or 'without leaving issue at the
time of his death'; . . . or 'intestate and without issue' ", the
Supreme Court of the United States thought that "In none of
these cases, however, was the devise so expressed that it could be
construed as creating an estate tail", and finally held that:
"A careful examination of the adjudged cases in Penn-
sylvania irresistibly compels us to the conclusion that there is
no settled rule of property in that State, by which the words
of the devise to Amanda Stephens, 'and in the event of
Amanda dying unmarried, or, if married, dying without off-
spring by her husband' should be construed as restricted to
her death in the testator's lifetime, making the devise over
substitutionary, and to take effect only upon her death within
that time." 44
On this somewhat delicate question, therefore, the Supreme Court
of the United States decided that the prior decision of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania was not "declaratory of the settled law of
Pennsylvania as to the effect of such devises", and therefore that
it was the duty of the Supreme Court of the United States, (of
course trying to construe the law of Pennsylvania), to decide
"What estate did Amanda Stephens take under the devise". Citing
a line of cases beginning with Eichelberger v. Barnitz,4  the Su-
41 Supra note 40, at iO3, 17 Sup. Ct. at 493.
439 Watts 447 (Pa. i84o).
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preme Court held that a devise over upon failure of issue imported
in Pennsylvania an indefinite failure of issue; that the word "un-
married" should be disregarded under Vaughan v. Dickes;46 that
therefore Amanda took an estate tail. The court thought also that
this meaning of the expression "in the event of Amanda dying
unmarried, or, if married, dying without offspring by her hus-
band" was not affected by either the power of sale, or the gift over
"to the heirs of John Barber"; also that there was no occasion to
look beyond the language of the will to such extrinsic facts as "the
testator's state of health or to his length of life afterwards".
To summarize the decisions in these cases, it is interesting to
note the following: (i) Judge Ewing in the Court of Common
Pleas of Allegheny County in the first opinion in the Mitchell case,
held that Amanda took under the will an estate tail which had been
duly barred. On appeal in the same case, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that the language used by the testator created
not an indefinite, but a definite failure of issue of Amanda; inas-
much, however, as definite failure was, as construed by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, to take effect in the testator's
lifetime only, Amanda took an absolute estate and the judgment
for the defendant was, therefore, affirmed. When the case reached
the federal courts in Barber v. Pittsburgh Railway Co., the Circuit
Court in an opinion by Acheson, J., said:
"If we were to hold that the devise to Amanda Stephens
did not pass to her an estate in fee simple, this conclusion
would not help the plaintiffs, for we cannot agree with them
in their contention that Amanda took only a defeasible fee.
In our view of this will, if Amanda did not take a fee simple,
she took at least an estate tail." 47
In other words, the lower federal court held for the defendant
either on the ground that if the ruling of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in the Mitchell case prevailed, defendants were entitled, or
if the opinion of Judge Ewing in the lower court that Amanda
took a fee tail prevailed, the defendants were likewise entitled.
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States in terms refused
"Supra note 28.
'69 Fed. 501, 504 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1895).
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to take the substitutional view adopted by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court and placed its decision flatly upon the ground that
Amanda took a fee tail. (The Circuit Court of Appeals, upon
receiving this opinion, affirmed the judgment of the lower court.)
The net result, therefore, was a striking division of opinion be-
tween the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopting the substi-
tionary view, on the one hand, and the Federal Supreme Court,
adopting the indefinite failure of issue view on the other. No one
of the three decisions which adopted the theory of an indefinite
failure of issue, however, is instructive on the question whether, if
the correct construction were a definite failure of issue, that failure
of issue should be restricted to the testator's lifetime or not; on the
other hand, the opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the
Mitchell case is a flat refusal to adopt the indefinite failure of issue
view,-with the assumption that, the indefinite failure of issue
theory being inadmissible, the question was just when the definite
failure of issue must occur. The case in its several stages presents
very clearly the various views which might be taken, although it
should be added that since the Act of 1897 48 in Pennsylvania
doing away with the indefinite failure of issue theory, the federal
courts would, if the same question now confronted them, be obliged
to decide between the successive and substitutional views, whereas
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is clearly committed not only by
its decision in the Mitchell case, but in many others, to the substi-
tutional view.
The weight of authority in this country favors the substi-
tutionary view. One authority says:
"It has been held that where there is an immediate gift
to a person and the gift over on the death of the beneficiary
without issue, the latter gift in the absence of words indicating
a contrary intention takes effect upon the death without issue
happening at any time, as well after as before the death of the
testator. (Citing a number of cases chiefly English and
Canadian) ; but as a general rule in such cases the gift over
refers to death occurring during the lifetime of the testator,
unless it appears from the context of the will and the sur-
rounding circumstances that the testator intended the gift to
P L.213.
588 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
take effect upon the death of the person named at any time, as
well after as before the testator's death." (Citing cases from
sixteen of the American States.) 49
Many of these later cases have been examined, but the exam-
ination has not disclosed a single weighty argument in support of
the decision reached. Such cases, for example, are Bronson v.
Wallingford,50 Wright v. Charley, 1 Collins v. Collins.5 2  The
state in which the doctrine has been most strongly supported is
New York; Washbon v. Cope '3 being, perhaps, the leading case.
Even in New York, however, the arguments used in support of the
decisions do not seem very formidable, and, as in other jurisdic-
tions, there seems to be a tendency to avoid a too harsh application
of the rule by finding in the will other indications which enable
the court to reach the conclusion that the gift over was intended to
take effect in the case of death without issue at any time.
54
HISTORY OF THE SUBSTITUTIONARY RULE IN ENGLAND
It is not deemed necessary to refer to cases prior to Edwards
v. Edwards." In that case a testator devised certain real estate to
trustees upon trust to pay the rents to his wife during widowhood,
and subject to this life interest of his wife, he devised certain prop-
erties to several children. Ile then states, "Further, my will and
meaning is, that if one of my three children shall die and leaving
no children born in wedlock, his or her share shall be equally
divided between the other two and for their heirs forever; And if
two of my children shall die, and leaving no children born in wed-
lock, their share shall go to the surviving one and his or her heirs
forever." The widow survived the testator a few years and died
without having married. Later John, the eldest son, married and
died without issue, having devised his estates by a will; his brother
4940 Cyc. 1504.
'54 Conn. 511, 9 AtI. 392 (1887).
51 129 Ind. 257, 28 N. E. 7o6 (1891).
M i-16 Iowa 703, 88 N. W. 1097 (1902).
144 N. Y. 287, 39 N. E. 388 (1895).
"
4Lawrence v. Callam, 236 N. Y. 168, 14o N. E. 232 (1923).
z15 Beav. 357 (852).
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and sister claimed the estates devised to John by their father by
virtue of the conditions contained in their father's will. Sir John
Romilly decided against the claim of the brother and sister. In
so doing he made the following analysis of the cases of this general
character:
"There are four classes of cases in which questions of
this description arise, and it will be necessary for me shortly
to refer to each, in order to make my decision in the present
case clear and intelligible. The first case is, that of a simple
gift to A., and if he shall die, then to B. The second case is,
that of a gift to A., and, if he shall die without leaving a child,
then to B. The third and fourth classes of cases are where
these gifts to A. and B. are preceded by a life-estate, or some
other interest of partial duration, and may be described thus:
a gift to one for life, and, after his decease, to A., and if A.
shall die, then to B.; and fourthly, a gift to one for life, and
after his decease, to A., and if A. shall die without leaving a
child, then to B." 56
After holding that in accordance with the weight of authority in
the first case, "the words applying to the gift over must . . . be
confined to the death of the testator"; that in the second case that
"it has always been held that if at any time, whether before or
after the death of the testator, A should die without leaving a
child, the gift over takes effect, and the legacy vests in B"; that
in the third case, "if A die before the period of possession or pay-
ment, i. e. before the death of the tenant for life of the legacy, the
legacy goes to B"; he decides that in the fourth case (which was
the case before him) "the rule is that these words indicating death,
without leaving a child, as the event on the occurrence of which
the gift over is to take effect, must be construed to refer to the
occurring of that event before the period of distribution". In
other words, admitting (in the second case) that ordinarily in the
case of a gift to A and if he shall die without leaving a child to B,
the gift over takes effect "If at any time, whether before or after
tfie death of the testator, A should die without leaving a child";
he distinguishes the case before him where the gift to A was sub-
'Ibid. at 361.
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ject to a prior life interest, and holds that the prior life interest
alters the situation so that the gift over is effective only if A die
without leaving a child before the period of distribution. His
position does not even suggest the substitutional theory except in
the rather special case of the gift to A following a prior life inter-
est to someone else.
Just why such prior life interest should affect the construction
of the otherwise similar language used in cases two and four of
Lord Romilly is not apparent, and the case was flatly overruled
by the House of Lords in O'Mahoney v. Burdett.5 In that case
a testator had bequeathed to his sister certain stock for life, and
after her death to her daughter and also said, "If my said niece
should die unmarried or without children, the £iooo I here will to
revert to my nephew". The sister died in the lifetime of the tes-
tator; Grace, her daughter, survived the testatrix and died without
leaving children. Her husband, the appellant in this case, relying
on Edwards v. Edwards," contended that by the expression "If
my said niece should die unmarried or without children", it is to
be understood the death of the niece unmarried or without children
not at any time whatsoever, but only during the lifetime of the
tenant for life. The House of Lords, however, refused to take
this view, finding no difference "according to the ordinary and
literal meaning of the words" between "A bequest to A and if he
shall die unmarried or without children to B", and "a bequest to X
for life with remainder to A and if A die unmarried or without
children to B". After commenting on the cases cited by Lord
Romilly, the Chancellor says, "I am unable to find in any case prior
to Edwards v. Edwards any authority that the words introducing
a gift over in case of the death unmarried or without children of
a previous taker do not indicate, according to their natural and
proper meaning, death unmarried or without children occurring at
any time". 59 The result, therefore, is that assuming, as had Lord
Romilly in Edwards v. Edwards, that in the case of a gift to A
for life and if he shall die without children, the gift over takes
'Supra note IO.
'Supra note 55.
"' Supra note 57, at 398.
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effect "in case of A's death without children at any time", the
House of Lords definitely holds that this, as it seems to them,
obvious and undisputed proposition, applies equally even though,
as in the case before them, the gift to A had been preceded by a
life interest to X. And the cases are numerous in which the doc-
trine of O'Mahoney v. Burdett has been recognized in more recent
decisions in England. This construction has also been adopted in
Canada.60
CASES IN WHICH THE ENGLISH RULE HAS BEEN FOLLOWED
In the case of Naylor v. Godman,6 1 a testator directed that
the residue of his estate should be invested in land for the benefit
of six children of his daughter, each to have the enjoyment for life
with remainder to his or her children in fee; by a later provision
he stipulated that "It is my will that if one or more of my said
grandchildren shall die without issue, the share of the one or more
so dying shall vest in and become the property of the surviving
brothers and sisters of deceased equally". One of the six died
after the testator's death without issue. It was held that his share
passed to his surviving brothers and sisters, the court saying,
"Contention is, however, made that where the words in the will
refer to the death of the devisee, where such gift is immediate, that
is to take effect in possession, such words are always construed to
mean death of the devisee before the death of the testator. But
this is stating the doctrine too broadly." (Citing 3 Jarman on Wills
61 i--"this construction is only made ex necessitate rei, from the
absence of any other period to which the words can be referred.")
62
In a District of Columbia case 1a a testator had bequeathed a
fraction of his estate to his grandson George N. Herrell with a
proviso that "if my grandson should die without issue", then his
share to a daughter and another son. The court held that these
words meant in case of George's death at any time without issue,
and said, "While it is true that similar words have been held to
" Corwan v. Allen, 26 Can. Sup. 292 (1896).
aI09 MO. 543, ig S. W. 56 (1891).
0 Ibid. at 551, ig S. W. at 58.
"Herrell v. Herrell, 47 App. D. C. 30 (1917).
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refer to death in the lifetime of the testator, where no contrary
intention was manifest (citing cases) we deem it unnecessary to
consider those decisions because the Supreme Court of the United
States in Britton v. Thornton, 112 U. S. 527, 5 Sup. Ct. 271, laid
down the rule that, under a devise to one person in fee and in case
he should die under age and without issue to another in fee, the
devise over takes effect upon the death at any time of the first
devisee under age and without children." 64
In Connecticut, 5 a testator had bequeathed certain property
to a niece, Sara. He later provided, "It is my will that in case
either of them (Sara or another) should die without leaving chil-
dren or issue at the time of their respective deaths", then to the
children of his brother Horace. Sara died without leaving issue
after the testator's death. It was held that the administrators of
the estates of Horace's children were entitled, disapproving a
former decision.
66
In Britton v. Thornton,"7 a case that arose in Pennsylvania, a
testator bequeathed certain lands to one Eliza Thornton "Provided,
that should the said Eliza Ann die in her minority, and without
lawful issue then living", then over to the residue. The Supreme
Court of the United States held that the gift over was operative
whether she died in her minority and without lawful issue then
living in the testator's lifetime, or after the testator's death, fol-
lowing O'Mahoney v. Burdett. s This case was followed in First
National Bank v. De Pauw,"9 where the testator had devised cer-
tain lands to two grandchildren, "If either of them should depart
this life without leaving issue", then over to the survivor. The
court said:
"The whole question, then, is whether the words 'if
either of them should depart this life without leaving issue',
refer to the event of death before that of the testator, .
or after the testator's death. If the former is the true mean-
lIbid. at 32.
'Butler v. Flint, 91 Conn. 630, IoI Atl. 19 (1917).
'Lawlor v. Hallohan, 70 Conn. 87, 38 Atl. 903 (1897).
112 U. S. 526, 5 Sup. Ct. 291 (1884).
'Supra note io.
'75 Fed. 775 (C. C. D. Ind. 1896).
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ing, the gift over to the survivor is substitutionary merely,
depending on the contingency of the death of either of the
primary devisees in the lifetime of the testator, and designed
to prevent a lapse; and upon that construction, both of the
grandsons having survived the testator, the contingency upon
which the survivor was to take has gone, and each took an
absolute estate in fee. If, on the other hand, the words refer
to a death at any time, under the circumstances mentioned,
then, on the death of the testator, the grandsons took a base
or determinable fee, coupled with a contingent interest in
favor of each in the estate devised to the other, by way of
executory devise." 70
The court recognizes that in many cases in this country the substi-
tutionary rule has been adopted, but says:
"It is a rule resting rather upon authority and precedent than
upon reason, for it is by no means certain that it was not
the intention of the testator to control the ultimate devolution
of the title, after it had been enjoyed during life by the first
taker, in case he die without issue. Such a construction seems
to harmonize better with the popular use of the words, and to
give a natural, rather than an artificial, effect to the language
employed." 71
The court thought that there was sufficient in the will in question
to give the broader meaning to the clause, and cites Britton v.
Thornton 72 in support of its conclusion.
This same view had previously been taken in Crane v.
Cowell.73 There by will testator had devised certain real estate to
his grandchildren and added, "if any of my grandchildren should
die, leaving no surviving issue, then I give and devise all the estate
both real and personal herein given, to such grandchild, unto the
survivor or survivors of such as shall die as aforesaid, and unto
their heirs and assigns forever." Judge Curtis, after citing the
substitutionary rule applicable to the case of a gift to A and in
case of his death to B, says:
I Ibid. at 777.
Ibid. at 779.
Supra note 67.
72 Curt. 178 (U. S. C. C. 1854).
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"But it is manifest, that the whole basis of this reasoning
fails, if the will gives the property over, not simply if the
legatee die, but if his death is connected with some collateral
event, such as dying without issue, which is contingent. In
such case, there is no necessity to seek for a contingency, or
for ingrafting on the language of the testator, a limitation of
time, during which the event is to happen, to render it con-
tingent. For the testator has himself in terms announced an
event which may or may not happen after his decease, as the
contingency upon which the property is to go over." 74
He concludes:
"Though I do not intend to intimate any doubt of the
soundness of the rule of construction, which introduces into
a will such a limitation of time, in cases where it is necessary
to make a contingency, I feel no disposition to do it when ".
is not absolutely necessary. Indeed, the hypothesis that a
testator, in making a testamentary provision, to take effect
only upon and after his decease, really intended to provide
for events in his lifetime, is somewhat unnatural and improb-
able and has been more than once admitted to be so ...
In this case the basis of this rule of construction failing, and
the words of the testator fairly importing a dying at any
time without surviving issue, I do not feel at liberty to intro-
duce into the will the words 'in my lifetime', and thus make
the testatrix mean what she certainly has not said, and what
I cannot find cause to declare she must have meant." T5
He adds the following significant words, "Moreover, if the case at
bar came within the rules of construction contended for by the
complainant, the question between a definite or indefinite failure
of issue, which has so often arisen and has given rise to such
diversity of opinion, could in many cases have been avoided by
considering that death, and failure of issue, and survivorship, were
all to be referred to the lifetime of the testator." The court cited
Anderson v. Jackson,76 and added this comment: "The construction
of this will was thus repeatedly examined with the aid of the most
eminent counsel in the country, and I am not aware that it was
ever suggested, that the dying without issue, and the survivorship
7 Ibid. at 184.
'Ibid. at 185.
16 Johns. 382 (N. Y. 18ig).
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therein provided for, were events to occur before the decease of
the testator." This is a very forceful statement of the thought
that the courts that have adopted the substitutional view in recent
years have apparently not considered its effect upon many cases
previously decided which would have been decided otherwise if the
substitutionary theory had been adopted by the courts.
The entire question has been considered with more than usual
care in Drager v. McIntosh.7 7 In that case a testator had devised
all the residue of his property to seven children in equal shares:
"In case of the death of any of my said children leaving heirs of
their body alive, then the interest of such deceased child shall go
to his or her children in equal proportions, but in case any of my
said children shall-die leaving no child or children or descendants
of deceased child or children," then over to the other children or
their descendants. After the testator's death the children attempted
to convey the title to certain lands in fee simple, and this suit was
brought to decide whether they could pass a title free from any
contingency. Declining to adopt the substitutionary doctrine,
which was contended for by the appellee, the court said:
"This is directly contrary to the well established rule of con-
struction which has been announced in numerous cases in
which this court has construed similar clauses in wills, that
when a devise is made to a person in fee, and in case of his
death to another in fee, the absurdity of treating as contingent
or uncertain the one event which is sure to occur to all living,
requires an interpretation of the devise over as referring only
to death in the testator's lifetime, but when the death of the
first taker is coupled with other circumstances which may
occur or which may never occur, as death under age or with-
out issue, the devise over takes effect, unless controlled by
other provisions of the will, according to the ordinary and
literal meaning of the words, upon death under the circum-
stances indicated whether before or after the death of the
testator." 78
The decision is the more important in view of the fact that Farmer,
J., specially concurred only on the express ground that the gift
7316 IlL. 46o, 147 N. E. 433 (1925).
"Ibid. at 464, 147 N. E. at 435.
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over was only to take effect if the event occurred in the testator's
lifetime. The significant fact, therefore, is that despite a number
of earlier cases which pointed towards the adoption of the substi-
tutionary doctrine in that state, the Supreme Court of Illinois
expressly repudiated that doctrine in Drager v. McIntosh, and
planted itself firmly on the same ground as the House of Lords in
O'Mahoney v. Burdett, and the Supreme Court of the United
States in Brinton v. Thornton, both of these cases being cited in
the opinion of the court. This case was followed and approved in
Liesman v. Liesman,79 where Fifer v. Allen S0 is quoted as follows:
"The rule established in the case of O'Mahoney v. Bur-
dett has since been followed in England, and it has been
considered that there is a manifest distinction between a
devise over, not in the case of the death of the first devisee,
which is inevitable, but upon the happening of a contin-
gent event, such as the death of the first devisee, without
issue. In case of a devise simpliciter to one person and if
he should die, to another, the courts of England and this
country have construed the will upon the theory that the testa-
tor must have had some contingency in view, and inasmuch
as the death of the first devisee is a certain and not a contin-
gent event, the testator must have contemplated death within
some particular period of time, and to prevent a lapse and in
favor of vested rather than contingent interests, they have
considered the life of the testator to be that period. In the
case of Crane v. Cowell, 2 Curtis 178, the court, referring to
the rule of construction just stated, said: 'But it is manifest
that the whole basis of this reasoning fails if the will gives
the property over, not simply if the legatee dies, but if his
death is connected with some collateral event, such as dying
without issue, which is contingent. In such case there is no
necessity to seek for a contingency or for engrafting on the
language of the testator a limit of time during which the event
is to happen to render it contingent, for the testator has him-
self, in terms, announced an event which may or may not
happen after his decease, as a contingency upon which the
property is to go over'. In accordance with this rule, the
death of any of the testator's children mentioned in section 4
of the will must refer to death at any time, whether before or
after that of the testator."
33I Ili. 287, 293, 162 N. E. 855, 858 (1928).
60228 IM. 507, 81 N. E. i1o5 (igo7).
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The net result of the discussion seems to be as follows: First,
on principle, in case of a gift to A and his heirs and if he shall die
without issue then to B and his heirs, there seems to the writer to
be no question whatever but what the testator intended the gift
over to take effect if A died at any time without issue. It is true
that the cases are numerous in which it has been properly held that
such words cover the case of the death of A without issue in the
testator's lifetime, on the ground that the testator may easily have
had in mind the happening of the event in his own lifetime as well
as after his death, and may have intended in the former contin-
gency to have provided a substitutional gift to B. That, however,
is a very different thing from holding that by the use of such words
the testator meant to provide only for the case of A dying without
issue in his lifetime. The writer has tested out his theory as to
the popular construction of such clause by putting the question of
the proper meaning of these words to.his classes in Property over
a period of many years, and has found that only a negligibly small
proportion of the class take the view that the testator intended his
gift over to take effect in the case of the death of the first taker
in his own lifetime only. Secondly, the study of the cases has
developed the fact that while the substitutionary theory prevails
in many jurisdictions in this country, the opinions in which it has
been adopted, have seldom, if ever, given the matter very careful
consideration. The case of "a gift to A and his heirs and if he
die without issue to B" has been treated as analogous to "a gift
to A and his heirs and if he die to B"; quite overlooking the fact
that the reason for holding that the gift is substitutionary in the
second case, to wit, that the words "if he die" would otherwise be
meaningless, has no application whatever to the first case where
there is nothing in the nature of the case to require such a limited
meaning. On the other hand, in England what seems to the writer
to be the correct view has always been upheld, and the slip that
was made by Lord Romilly in Edwards v. Edwards81 was
promptly remedied by the House of Lords in O'Mahoney v. Bur-
dett,82 so that the law is settled in England in favor of the wider
2 Supra note 55.
12Supra note IO.
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meaning, namely, if A die without issue at any time, regardless of
whether there be a prior life estate to X or not. This view, as
above pointed out, has received some support in this country, i. e.
in Missouri and the District of Columbia, and particularly the
United States Supreme Court in Britton v. Thornton, where
O'Mahoney v. Burdett was followed in terms. The contrary rule
is thus properly described in the opinion in First National Bank v.
De Pauuw,8 3 where the court said:
"It is a rule resting rather upon authority and precedent
than upon reason, for it is by no means certain that it was not
the intention of the testator to control the ultimate devolution
of the title, after it had been enjoyed during life by the first
taker, in case he die without issue. Such a construction seems
to harmonize better with the popular use of the words, and to
give a natural, rather than an artificial, effect to the language
employed."
There are various applications of the rule of Mickley's Ap-
peal 84 which are of interest. They are considered at length in the
article by Mr. Amram above referred to.85 For example, he sub-
divides the cases in which the question as to the application of
this rule has arisen into three classes: (i) A gift to A in fee and
if he die without issue then to X; (2) A gift to A for life re-
mainder to B in fee, and if B die without issue then to X; (3) A
gift to A for life, remainder in fee to B, but if A die without issue
then to X. He contends that with certain qualifications the rule
in Mickley's Appeal applies to cases in Group i; that as to cases
in Group 2 it applies in a modified form, i. e. that B takes an abso-
lute fee without reference to his possible subsequent death without
issue if he survives A; that in cases in Group 3 it does not apply,
for the obvious reason that A is only given a life estate which
there is no reason for the court to increase to a fee regardless of
whether he dies without issue or not.
It would lead the writer too far afield from his main object
to enter upon a careful consideration of these problems. His main
'Supra note 69.
Supra note i.
Amram, Pennsylvania Rules for Construction of the Words "Die Without
Issue" (1930) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 15.
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object without emphasizing too much the possible variations of the
problem has been to inquire just how the rule in Mickley's Appeal
arose in Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions, and secondly,
whether it really carries out the intention of the testator where it
is applied. He is himself convinced that the rule had its origin
in the confusion between the two quite different cases. First, is a
gift to A and if he die, to B; manifestly in such case, as A must
die some time, the phrase "if he die" must relate to some point of
time, and the only point of time that suggests itself is in the testa-
tor's lifetime. It is almost inevitable in such case that the phrase
should be treated as if the testator had said, "if A die in my life-
time", and construe the will accordingly. The second case is a gift
to A "and if he die without issue to B". Here, manifestly A may
die without issue either in the testator's lifetime or afterward.
There is no necessity, therefore, for the court construing the clause,
as they did in Mickley's Appeal, to mean only if A dies without
issue in my lifetime. Not only is there no necessity, but it is sub-
mitted that it is very much more likely that the testator is meaning
to cover the case of A's dying without issue at any time, and that
therefore it should be immaterial whether A dies without issue in
the testator's lifetime or after his death. It is rather interesting
to note that in all cases which have adopted this rule, at least in
this state, the provision has been substantially "death without
children or death without issue"-sometimes accompanied by such
additional thoughts as "death unmarried". But it is perfectly easy
to suggest other contingencies which could hardly by any construc-
tion be held to relate simply to the testator's lifetime. Suppose, for
instance, the provision was "a gift to A and his heirs and if he
die under the age of 50 to B and his heirs", could it be contended
with any prospect of success that such clause meant "if he die
under the age of 50 in the testator's lifetime only"? It is sub-
mitted that probably no courts have gone this far and yet it seems
a manifest contradiction to hold that the expression "if he die
without issue", means only "if he die without issue in the testator's
lifetime"; whereas, on the other hand, "if he die before he reach
the age of 5o" means "if he die before the age of 50 at any time".
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If, as the author believes, the substitutionary view is incorrect,
the undeniable result is that in most of the jurisdictions in our
country where the substitutionary doctrine is maintained, the
wishes of the testator in many cases have been ruthlessly over-
turned. We have, therefore, a situation quite similar to that noted
above (i. e., the situation where, quite apart from the question here
involved, the common law had construed the words "if A die with-
out issue", as meaning an indefinite failure of issue). When it
once became plain that by giving such meaning the courts were
denying to a testator the right to dispose of the property as he
really wished, the common law rule of construction was repealed
by the passage of appropriate statutes. Following the principle of
such statutes, it is suggested that in Pennsylvania and other states
adopting the so-called substitutionary rule, a statute should be
passed as follows:
"That in all deeds, wills or other instruments bearing
date after the passage of this Act, words which may import
either a want or failure of issue of any person in the testator's
lifetime, or at any time, shall be construed to mean a want or
failure of issue at any time, unless a contrary intention shall
appear by the instrument in which such devise or gift is
made."
Such statute would be a natural supplement to the Act of July 9,
1897, P. L. 213; that Act provided in effect that words which
might import either a definite or indefinite failure of issue should
be construed to mean a definite failure of issue unless a contrary
intention appeared by the instrument in which such gift was made.
The proposed statute would go a step further and raise a presump-
tion in favor of a definite failure of issue of the first taker at any
time, rather than the presumption in favor of a failure of-issue in
the testator's life time, which is enforced by jurisdictions where
the substitutionary theory prevails.
